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On January 11, 1988 the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Centeno v. Shultz, an appeal from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' The Court of Appeals had held that a consular
determination denying an alien's application for a visitor's visa to the
United States was not subject to judicial review.2 The case itself was
not noteworthy, but the fact that the United States Supreme Court
seemingly accepted the proposition is of enormous significance.
Appellant Centeno is a Filipino citizen who applied at the United
States Embassy in Manila for a visitor's visa, which the consular
officer denied. Appellant Coane, Centeno's United States citizen
brother-in-law, had made unsuccessful efforts to secure a reversal of
the decision. On July 17, 1986, Coane filed a complaint in the
United States District Court, on behalf of himself and his brother-
in-law, against the Secretary of State and others, challenging the
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1. 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
2. Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005
(1988), related to a consular determination refusing a nonimmigrant visitor's visa under
section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b)
(1982).
denial of the visa. His complaint claimed that the denial was not
authorized by the statute, was arbitrary and capricious, and violated
Coane's first amendment rights. The district court dismissed the ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction on January 23, 1987.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, the determina-
tion below was affirmed. The court noted:
Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, the denial of visas to aliens is not subject
to review by the federal courts. Such review is limited solely to the determi-
nation of whether a facially legitimate and bona fide reason exists for the
denial of the waiver. Since Centeno was denied a visa under 8 U.S.C. §
1184(b), which does not provide for a waiver, however, the denial of his visa
is not subject to any review by a federal court.
This result is in accord with our prior holdings that decisions of United
States consuls on visa matters are nonreviewable by the courts."
The lack of any meaningful administrative or judicial review of
the denial of United States entry visas is one of the major outrages
of the American immigration system. It is a condition which has not
improved with the passage of time. This author's first article on the
subject,5 published in 1959, was recently republished by the Ameri-
can Immigration Lawyers Association as part of a program on the
subject, presumably because despite the passage of almost thirty
years the law on the subject has not meaningfully changed. Ameri-
can consular officers, stationed abroad, still wield unbridled power
with respect to the issuance or denial of immigrant and nonimmi-
grant visas. They are probably the only administrative employees of
the United States government whose functions have been insulated
from administrative and judicial review. This situation has been the
subject of considerable scholarly criticism.6
Previous attacks upon the fortress-like authority of consular of-
ficers in this area, so vital to American life, have been largely
unsuccessful.7
The existence of a procedure that permits American officials to
exercise unbridled power in an area which affects our relations with
the rest of the world is totally inappropriate in a society governed by
the rule of law. This is particularly intolerable in cases which impact
upon Americans whose relatives, friends, business associates, and
teachers are arbitrarily denied visas to the United States. At times
when it suits governmental purposes, the doctrine of consular absolu-
3. Centeno, 817 F.2d at 1212.
4. Id. at 1212, 1213-14 (citations omitted).
5. Wildes, Review of Denial of Visa, 36 INTERPRETER RELEASES 331 (1959) (re-
printed with permission of N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 18, and 19, 1959).
6. Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability: A Case Study in Administrative Abso-
lutism, 41 A.B.A. J. 1109 (1955); Gotcher, Review of Consular Visa Determinations, 60
INTERPRETER RELEASES 247 (1983); Bernsen, Consular Absolutism in Visa Cases, 63
INTERPRETER RELEASES 388 (1986).
7. See cases cited infra notes 39, 45, 53, 69, 82.
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tism in visa denial cases is clothed in the respected mantle of foreign
affairs. At other times, the government sees it as unnecessary to
overformalize review procedures in matters not deemed to be of high
significance. In a system where consular officers do not consider as-
signment to a visa unit as a prestigious post, it is unlikely that such
officers would err on the side of affording an alien applicant the ben-
efit of the doubt. A United States foreign service officer whose pri-
mary objective in life is to ultimately represent his country as an
ambassador is unlikely to be anxious to leave a trail of potentially
embarrassing decisions. Although the situation continues to be the
subject of much frustration, no meaningful administrative, judicial,
or legislative relief has been forthcoming.
While we have made major strides in the development of our im-
migration law in such areas as the elimination of the discriminatory
aspects of national quotas, racial criteria, and sexism, the last vestige
of arbitrariness in the system--consular absolutism-still remains
and now deserves to be removed. The provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA)8 which vests in United States consular
officers this unusual and exclusive jurisdiction to issue or deny visas,
grants the Secretary of State jurisdiction to review the work of con-
sular officers "except those powers, duties, and functions. . .relating
to the granting or refusal of visas." 9 This limitation of the Secretary
of State's authority has been understood to eliminate both adminis-
trative and judicial review.
The doctrine by which the courts have thus far acceded to this
unfortunate result raises inevitable questions about the power of
Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, particularly when
the statute contains no explicit limitation on the jurisdiction of
courts to review the denial of visas by United States consuls.10
Surely there is no presumption of nonreviewability in United States
8. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)). Since 1952, the substantive and pro-
cedural laws relating to immigration have been consolidated in Title 8 of the United
States Code.
9. INA § 104(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). While the statute precludes
review by the Secretary of State of both the grant and denial of visas, this article is
concerned only with the latter. This is because review of all visa grants is available ad-
ministratively. The INA provides for such review by Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) officials at the border where all visa holders must pass a second hurdle to
gain admission. The United States visa, unlike those of most countries, does not vouch-
safe admission; it permits the holder to request admission at a border. See INA §§ 211,
214, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1184 (1987).
10. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
legal doctrine or the common law. One must therefore conclude that
reading an implied limitation on judicial review into the law is an
unfortunate result of some difficult problems in the meager case law
which constitutes the limited jurisprudence in this area. I have there-
fore attempted to reanalyze these cases in the hope of finding some
ways to overcome these precedents for the rule that prevents us from
securing an adequate remedy in many immigration cases.
This paper will address, in Section I, the historic and legal prece-
dents which brought us to a status of consular absolutism with re-
spect to visa issuance and denials. Section II reviews the leading
cases commonly understood as the foundation for extending the stat-
ute's restriction upon administrative review by the Secretary of State
into the entirely separate area of denying judicial review. It argues
that judicial review should be possible, despite the current gloss on
the present statute and regulations, and offers a basis of distinguish-
ing the case law. Section III adds a constitutional argument which
should mandate judicial intervention to narrowly construe the statute
involved in order to avoid raising constitutional challenges. Finally,
Section IV deals with potential legislative remedies and recommends
Congress enact an amendment to the INA which would authorize
limited administrative review, particularly in cases which signifi-
cantly impact United States citizens and businesses.
SECTION I
A. Historic Development of The Grounds of Exclusion
During our early years as a nation, our borders were open. A law
prohibiting the importation of Oriental slave labor, enacted in
1862,11 was Congress's first effort to restrict immigration. An 1875
statute barred the entry of prostitutes and convicted criminals. 2 The
first general immigration statute, passed in, 1882, added lunatics, idi-
ots, and persons likely to become public charges to the short list of
excludable aliens.' 3 An 1891 amendment excluded paupers, sufferers
of certain contagious diseases, and polygamists. 14 Epileptics, profes-
sional beggars, and anarchists-the first group whose restriction was
predicated on political tenets-were excluded in 1903.15 In 1950
communists and aliens affiliated with totalitarian parties were added
11. Act of Feb. 19, 1862, 12 Stat. 340. In its final form, the bill was amended to
drop the phrase "against their will and without their consent," thus outlawing the entire
coolie trade. E. HUTCHISON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965, at 48 (1981).
12. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477 (§§ 1, 2, 4 repealed 1974).
13. Act of August 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (§§ 1, 2 superseded 1903).
14. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084 (generally superseded by Act of June 27,
1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163).
15. Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (§ 2 repealed 1917).
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to the growing list of exclusionary grounds. 16 Currently, there are
thirty-three categories of excludable aliens.17
Early Supreme Court cases challenging America's restrictive im-
migration policies produced various theories sustaining these policies.
In 1884 the Court held that Congress's power to regulate immigra-
tion was based on the Commerce Clause. 8 In 1889, the Court held
that Congress's power to exclude aliens must be within an indepen-
dent nation's sovereignty over its own territory, because if the nation
"could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the
control of another power."' 19 Congress's enumerated powers over for-
eign commerce, naturalization, and war powers, supplemented by the
"necessary and proper" clause, were first cited by the Court in 1892
as the sources of the implied congressional power to exclude prospec-
tive alien immigrants and visitors.20 In an 1896 case, the Court en-
dorsed the congressional power to forbid entry of aliens solely "as a
matter of public policy" without reference to the enumerated powers
of Congress.2' In 1904, the Court held that the power to bar the
entry 'of aliens is either inherent in sovereignty or essential to self-
preservation, or derived from the enumerated powers of Congress,
principally from the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations.22
Despite the confusion as to exactly why the Court ruled as it did,
it is clear that Congress has plenary power to establish rules gov-
erning the admission of aliens and to exclude all those who possess
whatever characteristics Congress has forbidden.
While recognizing that Congress's authority in this area also de-
rives from its enumerated legislative powers and from the political
nature of immigration decisions, the Supreme Court chose, early on,
to insulate from judicial review the immigration policies enacted by
the legislature. Often the Court was more comfortable with the doc-
trine that the powers of Congress were derived from the nebulous
sovereignty of nations, a doctrine which permitted fewer theoretical
challenges. 2
3
16. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, 64 Stat. 987, 1006
(§7 repealed 1968).
17. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982).
18. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
19. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
20. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
21. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
22. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904).
23. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). But see id., at 774-85 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (ours was a government of limited powers, unlike the tyrannies our found-
Moreover, early cases held that Congress had the power to dele-
gate its immigration powers to the Executive branch and, in so do-
ing, delegate much of its immunity from judicial scrutiny. In 1893,
the Supreme Court held that congressional power to exclude or expel
aliens may be exercised entirely through executive officers.24 In
1895, the Court held that an alien's right of reentry under statute or
treaty may be determined exclusively and with finality by executive
officers "in respect of a matter wholly political in its character." 25
Thus were laid the premises of the exemption of certain administra-
tive officers from judicial scrutiny.
By the turn of the century, the lower federal judiciary had been
clearly and repeatedly informed by the Supreme Court that immi-
gration matters were largely committed to legislative and executive
hands and were not a proper subject for judicial intervention. This
era of deference to the political branches was later to give rise to the
doctrine of nonreviewability of consular decisions.
B. Development of the Visa Issuing Function
In 1917, the Departments of State and Labor issued a Joint Order
to Diplomatic, Consular and Immigration Officers for the first time
requiring passports and visas for aliens to enter the United States.28
This directive specified that the consuls ascertain that the alien un-
derstood the various exclusionary provisions of our immigration laws,
and make a notation on the visa that the alien had been "advised
that he will probably be rejected and deported" if the consular of-
ficer felt that the alien was inadmissible.27 The Joint Order appears
to have required the consul to issue a visa if he was presented with a
valid passport. Denying the alien admission would start at the immi-
gration inspection point upon entry and not in the consul's office
ing fathers opposed, whose powers were absolute; the first amendment was intended to
limit the powers of Congress). If, as in most cases, the power to exclude is based upon
sovereignty, rather than on the Constitution, and if, as the government invariably argues,
it may be totally delegated to executive officers, then the executive (in this case, the
consul) has been placed beyond the reach of the law. This writer submits that this could
not be the case. Certainly no consul has the right to exclude a United States citizen from
the country. Some authorities believe that there are federal constitutional restraints on
Congress's power to exclude and its power to delegate that power to executive officers,
and that reliance on "sovereignty" is no basis for overriding these restraints. See Henkin,
The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at our
Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985).
24. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714-15 (1893).
25. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 548 (1895).
26. Joint Order of the Department of State and the Department of Labor, Requir-
ing Passports and Certain Information from Aliens Who Desire to Enter the United
States During the War (July 26, 1917), reprinted in U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OF-
FICe, LAWS APPLICABLE TO IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 1042 (E. Avery ed. 1953)
[hereinafter GPO IMMIGRATION LAWS].
27. Id. at 1044.
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abroad. Accordingly, the first American document requiring an alien
to have a visa obliged the consul to issue it, albeit with a warning.
The consul's function was informational; excludability was adjudi-
cated at the border.
The first congressional enactment giving rise to the current system
of consular visas was a wartime measure which authorized the presi-
dent to prescribe "reasonable rules, regulations and orders" to gov-
ern persons wishing to depart from or enter into the United States.2"
This 1918 legislation refers to "permits to enter the United States
and evidence of such permission," but no specific mention is made of
passports or visas or by whom such permission shall be granted. Pur-
suant to this congressional authorization, President Wilson issued a
proclamation finding that public safety required the implementation
of restrictions and prohibitions on departure and entry of aliens.29
On the same day, President Wilson issued an Executive Order pro-
viding, among other things, that "no alien shall be allowed to enter
the United States unless he bears a passport duly visaed in accor-
dance with the terms of the Joint Order to the Department of State
and the Department of Labor issued July 26, 1917."a This Execu-
tive Order also conferred final responsibility for supervising the per-
mission of aliens to enter the United States upon the Secretary of
State.3 1 Thus, the passport and visa requirements were not statuto-
rily created but adopted by a presidential executive order.
After World War I, the visa requirement would have been phased
out, like most other war-related congressional enactments and execu-
tive implementing orders, were it not for the fact that a fee of one
dollar was then being charged for each visa application and an addi-
tional fee of nine dollars was charged for each immigrant visa issued.
Thus, in 1921, Congress passed "[a]n act making appropriations for
the Diplomatic and Consular Services for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1922" 32 with the proviso that "the provisions of the Act approved
May 22, 1918, shall, in so far as they relate to requiring passports
and visas from aliens seeking to come to the United States, continue
28. Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 223-
26(b)), reprinted in GPO IMMIGRATION LAWS, supra note 26, at 379.
29. Proclamation No. 1473, reprinted in 40 Stat. 1829, 1830 (1918).
30. Exec. Order No. 2932, reprinted in GPO IMMIGRATION LAWS, supra note 26,
at 1050, 1061.
31. Id. at 1050, 1063.
32. Expenses, Passport Control Act, ch. 113, 41 Stat. 1217 (1921) (§1 repealed
1952).
in force and effect until otherwise provided by law."33 Despite the
fact that the 1918 Act did not mention passports or visas, let alone
require these documents, the 1921 Act extending it did.
Early challenges to the criminal provisions of the 1918 Act con-
strued its 1921 extension as necessarily extending the executive or-
ders issued pursuant to it. However, criminal prosecutions under the
1921 extension were dismissed since the 1921 legislation did not ex-
pressly extend those provisions of the 1918 Act, and there could be
no liability for a "constructive offense."3 But the visa requirement
remained intact.
The requirement that aliens seeking admission to the United
States possess visas issued by United States consular officers first
made its permanent entry on the statute books with the Immigration
Act of 1924.35 President Coolidge then issued an executive order re-
quiring that all aliens present immigration visas as provided in the
1924 Immigration Act.38 The visa requirement has been preserved in
every subsequent revision of United States immigration law.
37
SECTION 2
A. Development of the Case Law
It was not long after the visa requirement became law that court
challenges arose in habeas corpus review of exclusion orders result-
ing from the alien not having a visa, or not having the right kind of
visa. In the latter instance, where the issued visa was found to be
"irregular" by immigration inspectors, the courts were willing to ap-
ply the maxim that "equity regards as done that which ought to have
been done" and order the alien released. For example, if the consul
neglected to sign a visa or used the wrong form, the courts found
that such technical failings on the part of consular officers would not
result in the alien's exclusion.38
There are two seminal cases on the question of consular
nonreviewability. One of the cases most often cited for the proposi-
tion that consular visa denials are not reviewable is London v.
Phelps, decided by the Second Circuit in 1927.11 A British subject
who wanted to visit her children in New York was denied a visa by
33. Id.
34. Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1925).
35. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 157 (§9 repealed 1952).
36. Exec. Order No. 4027 (1924), reprinted in GPO IMMIGRATION LAWS, supra
note 26, at 1074.
37. INA § 221, 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1982). The issuance of visas is expressly dele-
gated to consular officers by INA § 104(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
38. In re Spinnella, 3 F.2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); see also infra note 44.
39. United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. de-
nied, 276 U.S. 630 (1928).
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the consul in Montreal. She crossed the United States-Canada bor-
der and was detained as an excludable alien because she did not
have a visa. On appeal from an order discharging a writ of habeas
corpus,40 she argued that the issuance of a visa is a mere ministerial
act and consequently her failure to obtain one was immaterial. In a
fairly brief opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected her argument and
sustained the legislation requiring aliens to have a visa before apply-
ing for entry, as well as the provision providing for the excludability
of aliens without a visa. In light of the previous half-century of judi-
cial deference to Congress in the field of immigration, the Phelps
decision came as no great surprise. Surprising, however, was the last
paragraph of the opinion, which is clearly dicta and which appears
as if it were an afterthought, given the question before the court.
The court added: "Whether the consul had acted reasonably or un-
reasonably is not for us to determine. Unjustifiable refusal to vis [a] a
passport may be ground for diplomatic complaint by the nation
whose subject has been discriminated against. . . . It is beyond the
jurisdiction of the court." '41 The only authority cited for this defini-
tive pronouncement was "3 Moore's Digest, 996."'42
Moore's International Law Digest was the reference source. 3
Moore's Digest 996 consists of a paragraph about how Czarist Rus-
sia's late nineteenth century policy of refusing to visa the passports
of American missionaries and Jews was the subject of diplomatic
correspondence. A second paragraph notes that on April 21, 1904,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution to the following
effect:
that the President be requested to renew negotiations with the governments
of countries where discrimination is made between American citizens on the
ground of religious faith or belief to secure by treaty or otherwise uniform-
ity of treatment and protection to American citizens holding passports duly
issued by the authorities of the United States in order that all American
citizens shall have equal freedom of travel and sojourn in those countries,
without regard to race, creed, or religious faith.
4 1
Moore's Digest is more a work on diplomatic history than what
would be considered a law book today. Bearing in mind that interna-
tional law in the pre-United Nations era was founded upon bilateral
treaties and the principles of custom and comity, diplomatic history
was a useful source for precedents in the area of consular visa deter-
40. Id. at 289.
41. Id. at 290.
42. Id.
43. 3 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 526, at 996-97 (1906).
minations. What the Second Circuit learned from Moore's was that
when an American citizen was denied a visa to enter a foreign coun-
try, his only recourse was to have the State Department try to inter-
cede. That appeared to be the established customary approach.
Moreover, through the operation of comity, if an American's only
recourse against a visa denial was through diplomatic channels, then
an alien could have no greater recourse if he were denied a visa to
come to the United States. The matter was evidently committed to
those branches of government responsible for the conduct of foreign
affairs. The federal judiciary had a long tradition of adhering to its
own self-imposed rule of not meddling in foreign affairs. By raising
the consular visa decision to the level of the exercise of foreign af-
fairs discretion, the court placed that decision beyond its jurisdiction
to review.
The pronouncement was quickly echoed by district courts around
the country when visa questions were presented in habeas corpus ac-
tions. In 1928, in the Northern District of California, the exclusion
of a Chinese youth was successfully challenged. He had a visa but it
was not the right type for him to accompany his merchant father.
The court said: "The granting or denying of a visa involves the exer-
cise of discretion by consular officers with which the courts will not
interfere, but the same rule does not apply to the form upon which
an application is prepared.
44
Next to London v. Phelps, the most often cited authority for the
doctrine of judicial nonreviewability of a visa denial was the 1929
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Ulrich v. Kellogg.
4 5
Ulrich, a naturalized American citizen, applied for a writ of manda-
mus to compel issuances of a visa to his alien wife in Germany. The
consul in Berlin based his denial on Ulrich's wife's convictions for
crimes involving moral turpitude-three times for larceny and once
for abetting a forgery. The court refused to issue the writ, finding
that the power to grant a visa was committed to consular officers and
that no "provision of the immigration laws. . .provides for an official
review of the action of the consular officers in such case by a cabinet
officer or other authority.
'4 6
The issue of review was directly raised in Ulrich. The court's lan-
guage is unclear in explaining whether there was no judicial power
to review the consular officer's decision or whether it was only that
no administrative authority existed to direct the consular officer to
44. Ex parte Seid Soo Hong, 23 F.2d 847, 848 (N.D. Cal. 1928); see also supra
note 38 and accompanying text. Equity allows a court to correct a technical defect of an
issued visa, but does not allow a review of the visa denial.
45. United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 868 (1929).
46. Id. at 986.
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grant the visa, thereby precluding the issuance of the specific remedy
of mandamus to any party before the court. Secretary of State Kel-
logg would have been required to do the ministerial act of issuing a
visa, had Ulrich prevailed. The procedural understanding of the deci-
sion seems the more reasonable one because the court expressly held
that the offenses for which the alien had been convicted involved
moral turpitude, 47 thereby actually reviewing and upholding the sub-
stantive merits of the consul's determination to deny the visa. Signifi-
cantly, there is no repetition of the London v. Phelps language that
the consul's decision is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. The
case may therefore be limited by its facts and actually stand for the
proposition that a court may review the merits of a consul's denial of
a visa. The unavailability of mandamus is inherent in the remedy.
The consular act in granting or denying a visa is discretionary and
mandamus will only lie for the enforcement of a mandatory act.
By referring to the immigration laws for the alien's exclusive rem-
edy, the Ulrich decision reflects the reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lem Moon Sing v. United States.48 In that case,
an alien sought to challenge his exclusion in habeas corpus proceed-
ings, arguing that even if Congress's power to exclude him was be-
yond question, the courts should have habeas jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the statute had been lawfully applied. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument because Congress had not provided for
habeas review in exclusion cases. The Court reasoned then that
"[t]he power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the
United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which
they may come to this country" meant that it could also "have its
declared policy in that respect enforced exclusively through execu-
tive officers without judicial intervention. ' 49 The Supreme Court had
retreated from this position twenty years before Ulrich, permitting
habeas review of exclusion orders for denial of a fair hearing5" or for
the application of ad hoc grounds of exclusion against an alien.5
The Supreme Court has manifested its unwillingness to permit ju-
dicial review of consular visa denials in habeas corpus actions.52 In
1932, in Polymeris v. Trudell,53 the Court noted the repeated at-
47. Id.
48. 158 U.S. 538 (1895); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 547.
50. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
51. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
52. See supra note 1.
53. United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932).
tempts of resident aliens in Greece to secure return permits from the
United States consul in Athens, in the course of which they hired
attorneys in Greece and in the United States to no avail. Their
American lawyer recommended that they go to Canada and enter
the United States without permits or visas and then challenge their
exclusion in habeas corpus proceedings. The Court held that the ex-
clusion was legal and that the aliens "must show not only that they
ought to be admitted but that the United States by the only voice
authorized to express its will, has said so.' ' 5" A habeas action is not
the way to review a consul's visa denial, and the Court would not
allow the plaintiff to gain indirectly the jurisdiction of the Court
where jurisdiction to review the matter was not available directly.
55
The 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel,56 while it dealt with a
review of a visa denial, was not a consular review case. The exercise
of discretion being challenged in Kleindienst was the Attorney Gen-
eral's failure to waive the inadmissibility of Mandel, who was a
Marxist academician excludable under the INA.57 The Supreme
Court quoted its Lem Moon Sing decision of 1895, stating that Con-
gress had plenary power over immigration and that it may "have its
declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive
powers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adju-
dications. ' 58 Despite the reaffirmation of congressional power over
the design of immigration and visa policy and of executive freedom
to act "without judicial intervention," the Court nonetheless re-
viewed the validity of the Attorney General's decision, albeit with
the minimal "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" standard.5 9
Even this minimal standard of judicial scrutiny is a significant de-
parture from the complete abdication of judicial review which pro-
tected the attorney general's discretion in such cases as Knauff v.
Shaughnessy"0 and Shaughnessy v. Mezei,61 and which continues to
prevail in the area of judicial review of consular discretion.
54. Id. at 281.
55. A similar attempt by an alien who was denied a visa, and his American wife,
who joined him as a plaintiff, was rejected in Burrafato v. United States Dep't of State,
523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). In Burrafato, the consul
had violated his own regulations and failed to specify the grounds for refusal. An alien
outside the United States does not meet the standing threshold to pursue a habeas action
because, unlike an alien who has been ordered excluded and deported, he is not in official
custody. As with mandamus, the nature of the remedy precluded the use of the court's
power.
56. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
57. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
58. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
59. Id. at 770.
60. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
61. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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B. The Administrative Procedure Act
Flowing directly from Congress's plenary power to set policy con-
cerning alien entries and from the executive's power to implement
that policy free from all judicial scrutiny, the doctrine of consular
nonreviewabiity persisted despite the evolution of a common law
presumption in favor of judicial review of executive determinations,
the codification of that presumption in the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 (APA), and independent developments in the area of
procedural due process.
Even before the London and Ulrich decisions, the Supreme Court
was reviewing and invalidating exclusion orders for not being based
on the statutory scheme of excludable characteristics.6 2 This is indic-
ative of a judicial tendency, already evident at the turn of the cen-
tury, to address due process questions and arbitrary results of the
growing administrative exercise of delegated powers. The APA codi-
fied the common law presumption in favor of judicial review except
1) when the relevant statutes preclude judicial review either ex-
pressly or by implication; or 2) when "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."63
Does the immigration statute preclude judicial review, expressly or
by necessary implication? The INA has no provisions for judicial
review of consular visa denials. Section 104(a)(1) of the INA gives
the Secretary of State authority over "the powers, duties, and func-
tions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States, except
those powers, duties and functions conferred upon the consular of-
ficers relating to the granting or refusal of visas. ' 64 Because of the
strong common-law policy favoring reviewability, the courts have
been reluctant to imply a statutory preclusion of review even when a
statute refers to an administrative determination as "final. 65 Indeed,
the attorney general's decision to order deportation is referred to as
"final" in INA section 242(b). The Supreme Court construed "final"
to mean "administratively final" in 1955, and held that deportation
orders were subject to judicial review under the APA.16
62. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). See generally Note, First Amendment and the
Alien Exclusion Power - What Standard of Review?, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 457 (1983).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). The statute deals only with
administrative review by the Secretary of State.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). "[A]n administrative act is subject to judicial re-
view unless there is a persuasive reason to believe Congress decided to deny review."
Graham v. Caston, 568 F.2d 1092, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
The present statutory scheme for judicial review of exclusion and
deportation orders in the INA was enacted by Congress after the
courts began to review those orders on their own common-law initia-
tive. Senator McCarran and Congressman Walter were sponsors of
both the 1946 APA and the 1952 INA. In the context of debates on
the deportation provisions of the INA, each assured his respective
chamber that the APA was applicable to the immigration bill.
67
When Senator Lehman introduced an amendment stating that "the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be applicable to
all proceedings relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens," it
was severely criticized by Senator McCarran and rejected. 68 Lower
courts have taken this legislative history, together with the statute's
failure to provide for any review of consular visa denials, as-evidence
of congressional intent to maintain the status quo and to insulate
consular decisions from judicial review. 9
Is agency action so "committed to agency discretion by law" as to
preclude judicial review? I think not in the, area of visa eligibility.
The courts have viewed the "committed to agency discretion" excep-
tion to judicial review under the APA to apply only when there is
"no law to apply."17 0 The thirty-three statutory grounds for exclusion,
with the ample legislative, administrative, and judicial guidance
which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) applies on
a daily basis, provide abundant "law to apply" when a consul deter-
mines a visa applicant's excludability.
The legislative histories of the INA and APA are not conclusive
and a functional analysis of how both Acts would interact in the
area of consular review is a most compelling argument for the courts
to assume their proper role. As recently as 1972, the Supreme Court
premised the denial of review on the ground that an alien has no
right to enter the United States.71 Not even the most strident advo-
cate of aliens' rights would argue that an alien has an absolute right
to enter the United States. However, it is clear that he has a quali-
fied right of entry if he meets the statutory criteria for eligibility.
72
In 1973, the Supreme Court abandoned the traditional standing lim-
itation to those plaintiffs who claim an injury in their "legal
rights. 17 3 Moreover, the INA arguably vests a statutory entitlement
67. 98 CONG. REC. 4302 (1952) (statement of Rep. Walter); id. at 5329 (state-
ment of Sen. McCarran).
68. Id. at 5625.
69. See, e.g., Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
70. Slyper v. Attorney General, 827 F.2d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nora. Slyper v. Meese, 485 U.S. 941 (1988); see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
71. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
72. Cf. Scully, The Rights of Aliens in the Visa Process: Part I, 51 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 149, 150 (1974).
73. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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in United States citizens and permanent residents to have their fami-
lies together, an entitlement which implicates their liberty interests
and therefore merits procedural protection. 4
Section 10 of the APA provides that a "person. . .adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof. '7 5 This provision
intertwines judicial review and standing. It is often said that aliens
have no standing and therefore cannot achieve judicial review.78
Since 1970, the Supreme Court has construed standing under section
10 of the APA to require that a complainant demonstrate an "injury
in fact" to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated" by the statute that has allegedly been vio-
lated by the agency action.7 This "injury in fact" test includes
noneconomic injuries, and is not limited to traditionally identifiable
legal rights.78
This principle has been applied to an immigration case. The 1974
District of Columbia Circuit case of Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor79
held that if the plaintiff's allegation that no American workers could
be found to perform the job of live-in maid was correct, then the
plaintiff-employer had standing to sue because he suffered an "injury
in fact" when his maid was denied a labor certification.80 Further,
because "the employer's need for qualified workers is clearly not ig-
nored" by INA section 212(a)(14), that need was thus arguably
within the zone of interests protected and regulated by the INA.81
Likewise, a federal district court held that a legal permanent resi-
dent had standing when she unsuccessfully challenged denial of her
husband's visa in 1976.82
The Pesikoff rationale for standing under the APA applies to all
immigrant visa applicants because, by definition, each of these aliens
74. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
76. See supra note 55.
77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); see also Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
78. See supra note 73.
79. 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
80. Id. at 760.
81. Id.
82. Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In the Pena case, the
district court pointed out that a statute in force since 1856, 11 Stat. 64, provides for a
remedy "[w]henever any consular officer... is guilty of any willful malfeasance or abuse
of power... for all damages occasioned thereby." 409 F. Supp. at 1188. The statute was
virtually never used, and was repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-105, § 111(a)(1), 91 Stat. 848
(1977) (current version in 22 U.S.C. § 1199 (1982)).
must have a strong connection or relationship with someone in the
United States who has filed an immigrant visa petition on his be-
half.83 The goals of an immigrant visa applicant generally coincide
with those of American residents or citizens who may have standing,
while the goals of an applicant for a nonimmigrant visa often do not.
Sound policy might dictate drawing a line such as this in any event.
While no alien has a constitutional right to enter the United States,
prospective immigrants have a qualified statutory right to do So,84
which their families or prospective employers should be free to pur-
sue in United States courts when United States consuls improperly
deny them visas to immigrate here. Judicial review of such a denial
has not been precluded by either exception to the APA and therefore




While Congress has broad authority in the field of immigration
legislation and may choose to exercise its authority to the fullest ex-
tent, even affecting the fundamental liberties of those impacted by
its action, it may do so only by a clear expression of its intent.86 It is
thus a primary principle of constitutional law that whenever possible,
statutes should be construed so as to avoid raising serious questions
with respect to their constitutionality.8
There is only one statutory provision upon which the courts have
based their opinions that they lack jurisdiction to review consular
visa denials. This provision, which discusses the powers and duties of
the Secretary of State, provides:
The Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration and the
enforcement of the provisions of this [Act] and all other immigration and
nationality laws relating to. . .the powers, duties and functions of diplo-
matic and consular officers of the United States, except those powers, duties
and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting
or refusal of visas. . . . He is authorized to confer or impose upon any
employee of the United States, with the consent of the head of the depart-
ment or independent establishment under whose jurisdiction the employee is
serving, any of the powers, functions, or duties conferred or imposed by this
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1982).
84. See supra note 72.
85. A constitutional basis for seeking judicial review may also exist under the due
process clause of the United States Constitution when a person with standing under the
APA has been "deprived" of anything encompassed by the fifth amendment. Should not
the grant of an 1-130 petition filed by the relative of an alien entitle the petitioner to
have the beneficiary's case adjudicated according to law? The issue has not yet been
successfully raised. See Pena, 409 F. Supp. at 1187.
86. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959).
87. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936).
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[A]ct or regulations issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the
Department of State or of the American Foreign Service.88
This formulation is anything but a clear and unequivocal state-
ment of congressional intent to eliminate judicial review. A narrow,
and thus constitutional, construction of its provisions would require
that only review by the Secretary of State was precluded by statute,
not that judicial review was also precluded. If congressional author-
ity included the power to eliminate judicial review completely, and if
it was Congress's intention to do so, a clear statement must be used
by Congress to accomplish this purpose. 89
The principle requiring Congress to have expressed its intention in
a clear statement has always been applied in cases involving Ameri-
can citizens, in order to avoid raising serious constitutional questions.
In Kent v. Dulles,9" the United States Supreme Court refused to find
that section 211(A) of the Passport Act of 1926 gave the executive
the authority to deny a passport to a United States citizen based on
alleged communist affiliation. The Court stated that: "We hesitate to
find in this broad generalized. . .[provision] an authority to trench
so heavily on the rights of the citizen." 9'
The Court did not find the statute itself unconstitutional, but
merely found that an overbroad interpretation of its provisions would
raise serious constitutional questions, which could be avoided by a
narrow construction. The Court further stated that it
would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold that
Congress by § 1185 and § 211(a) had given the Secretary authority to
withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Con-
gress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent one, the Sec-
retary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of free
movement.9
The same principle has been applied to immigration cases relating
to aliens as well. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,93 the term "entry" in the
INA was interpreted not to include the return of a permanent resi-
dent from a brief trip outside the country. Similarly, the term "en-
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982); see supra note 64.
89. See Note, Abourezk v. Reagan: Curbing Recent Abuses of the Executive Im-
migration Power, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147 (1988).
90. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982),
provided that "[tihe Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause pass-
ports to be granted, issued, and verified. . .under such rules as the President shall desig-
nate and prescribe."
91. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
92. Id. at 130.
93. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
try" has been held not to apply to a case 94 when an alien plainly did
not expect or plan to enter a foreign port or place, likewise a narrow
construction to avoid raising constitutional issues. In Fong Haw Tan
v. Phelan,95 the Court narrowly interpreted a provision authorizing
deportation of an alien convicted "more than once" of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude not to include an alien convicted of multiple
counts in a single proceeding. The Court stated that: "[W]e will not
assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that
which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of
the words used."96
What is even more frightening than the overbroad judicial gloss
already given to the Immigration Act's limitation on the Secretary of
State's review of visa denials is the fact that the Secretary is author-
ized by statute to confer these powers upon "any employee of the
United States. 97 The statute authorizes the Secretary of State, with
the consent of the head of the department or agency involved, to
confer visa issuing functions, presumably with the same lack of ac-
countability, upon any other federal official. One wonders what
Professors Jaffee and Hart, who struggled in vain for any parallel in
our institutions for this despotic consular absolutism,98 would think
of this.
The doctrine of strict construction of immigration statutes is a
constitutional doctrine and does not rely upon the strict construction
requirement in criminal statutes. Deportation has always been judi-
cially determined to be a civil sanction, rather than a criminal pen-
alty.99 Its civil nature has been used in many judicial contexts to
justify the inapplicability of ex post facto laws.100 Similarly, its civil
nature has been pointed to as the basis for inapplicability of a double
jeopardy to the deportation of an alien for the same criminal viola-
94. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947). In Delgadillo, an alien who
was a lawful resident of the United States since'1923 was torpedoed at sea while working
aboard a merchant ship in 1942. His rescuers brought him to Cuba to recuperate and
then he was returned to the United States. In 1944, he was convicted of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude and was subsequently ordered deported for having committed such
crime within five years of "entry" into the United States.
95. 333 U.S. 6 (1948). The statute under which Fong was ordered deported re-
quired the deportation of "any alien... who is hereinafter sentenced more than once to
such a term of imprisonment because of conviction of any crime involving moral turpi-
tude." Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889, amended by Act of
June 28, 1940, ch. 438, § 20, 54 Stat. 667, 671, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(1982).
96. 333 U.S. at 10.
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
98. Hearings Before the President's Commission of Immigration and Naturali-
zation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575 (1952)
(statement of Professors Henry Hart and Louis J. Jaffee); see also REPORT OF THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WEL-
COME 146-52 (1953).
99. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
100. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
[VOL. 26: 887, 1989] Visa Denial Review
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tions for which he was already incarcerated. 10 1
Narrow construction of immigration statutes is not only consistent
with permitting the judiciary to accord the highest regard for Con-
gress's broad powers in the immigration field, but also permits the
court to check arbitrary administrative action and protect the rights
of American citizens involved.
SECTION 4
A Legislative Solution
Over the years, a number of legislative proposals have been intro-
duced in the Congress to provide for either administrative or judicial
review of visa denials. None of these proposals has been enacted into
law.
Typical of the judicial review proposals was that of Congressman
Barney Frank (D. Mass.). 102 As originally introduced, the bill au-
thorized judicial review on behalf of any person lawfully in the
United States if he or she was prevented from meeting with or com-
municating with any alien because that alien was excluded from the
United States on security grounds. The provision, like most other
parts of the bill, focused on ideological exclusions and authorized an
action to be brought in the federal district court in which the indi-
vidual resides or in which he intended to meet with or communicate
with the alien.10 3
The second type of proposal is typified by H.R. 2567,104 intro-
101. United States v. Ramirez-Aguilar, 455 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1972). Likewise,
challenges for denial of bail, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), and cruel and
unusual punishment, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), have been
unavailing for the same reason.
102. This measure, H.R. 1119, was introduced in February 1987 into the House of
Representatives. The original proposal provided for amending the grounds of exclusion
and deportation in the Immigration and Nationality Act, for removing the grounds of
ideologically-based exclusions and visa denials, as well as for the judicial review of visa
denials. However, a later version of the bill which ivas approved by the Immigration
Subcommittee on April 11, 1988 failed to include the judicial review provision, which
was considered too controversial for inclusion. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 406
(1988).
103. H.R. 1119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 406
(1988).
104. H.R. 2567 was introduced June 2, 1987: "A bill to establish a Visa Review
Board within the Department of State to review denials of certain visa application." It
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and had 22 cosponsors by March 22,
1988. H.R. 2567, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). It was again introduced on January 27,
1989 and again referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 661, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
duced by Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D. Tex.), providing for
the establishment of a Visa Review Board. The proposed Visa Re-
view Board was to be a part of the Department of State. The board
would have no effect upon the granting of a visa or admission of an
alien to the United States pending review by the Visa Review Board,
nor did it claim to affect the substantive law on the subject. Indeed,
it limited its jurisdiction to the specified types of visas, and did not
provide a forum for review of all visa denials.105
The first issue for proposed legislation is whether it should permit
administrative or judicial review of visa denials. The proposals to es-
tablish, within the Department of State, a Visa Review Board are
likely to incur less opposition on the part of the State Department
than a proposal for judicial review. In addition to providing for uni-
formity of decisionmaking, the State Department would probably
find that its Advisory Opinions branch has already a good deal of
material which may be used as guidance in decisionmaking with re-
spect to the interpretation of various statutory grounds of exclusion.
A further question to be considered is whether review should be
authorized for all visa denials. In fiscal year 1986,106 for example,
out of 1,127,689 nonimmigrant (for instance, visitors, students, and
temporary work visas) ineligibility findings, 797,962 were based
upon section 214(b) of the INA, which states that "[e]very alien
shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the
satisfaction of the consular officer. . .that he is entitled to a nonim-
migrant status.' 0 7 During the same period, 119,017 of 155,208 im-
migrant ineligibility findings and an additional 274,947 nonimmi-
grant ineligibility findings were based upon INA section 221(g).
That section of law states that "[n]o visa. . .shall be issued to an
alien if. . .it appears to the consular officer. . .that such alien is in-
eligible to receive a visa."108 These two provisions of law, equally
amorphous and containing no standards for decisionmaking, appar-
ently account for an overwhelming majority of visa denials. Thus,
while it would limit the number of appeals to eliminate those hold-
ings under sections 214(b) and 221(g), such a provision would have
little effect upon consular absolutism in visa denial cases.
While providing judicial review to all visa denials could strain the
already overloaded federal court system, providing administrative re-
view to all visa denials including those of tourist visa applicants,
could have a similar effect upon an administrative review board. Per-
mitting administrative review only of immigrant visa denials would
105. See H.R. 2567, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
106. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, 1986
REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE table XX.
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (1982).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982).
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provide no redress to numerous nonimmigrants who have important
reasons to seek entry into the United States. Limiting review to cer-
tain exclusionary grounds0 9 would likewise deny any remedy to per-
sons with substantial interests in their admission who are denied en-
try upon other grounds of exclusion, thus failing to curtail consular
absolutism.
In actual practice, the determination of which visa denials should
be subject to review is not simple, but there are guideposts to be
observed. While it is possible to debate the inclusion or exclusion of
various categories of visa applicants in any proposed legislation, the
Gonzalez bill provided a balanced approach, permitting review in the
designated areas in which there was a substantial interest in the
alien's eligibility for admission to the United States. That bill in-
cluded special immigrants and immediate relative immigrants, due
to the interest of American citizen spouses, parents, or adult chil-
dren, and preference immigrants, due to the interest of either a spon-
soring American employer or that of a citizen or resident spouse,
child, or parent. It also included returning nonimmigrant students,
exchange visitors, or vocational students and their immediate fami-
lies, with an obvious interest in avoiding the interruption of training
and education. It included nonimmigrant temporary workers alid in-
tracompany transferees in INA H and L categories" because of the
potential hardship to United States businesses, and nonimmigrant fi-
ancees of United States citizens. In each of the chosen categories,
there is a clear interest of an American business, citizen, or lawful
resident, or to any alien who has commenced training or schooling in
the United States.
The experience of the government during World War II may be
relevant. In endorsing the concept of administrative review of visa
denials, President Truman's Commission on Immigration and Natu-
ralization"' pointed to the experience of a two-person board of ap-
peals on visa cases which successfully processed over 22,600 visa ap-
peals during its three and one-half year wartime existence and
overturned lower level decisions that had rejected visa applications in
more than twenty-six percent of the cases. While there is no way of
estimating how many appeals will be filed under the appeal proce-
109. There are 33 grounds of exclusion from the United States. See INA § 212(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982).
110. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(H), (L), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H), (L) (1982).
111. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIZATION,
WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME 148, 149 (1953).
dure, what will clearly result is the removal of the aura of consular
absolutism which, it is suggested, will contribute to a better public
image for the United States abroad.
The time for a meaningful review procedure for visa denials has
arrived. It behooves us, as a nation guided under the rule of law, to
remove this anachronism from our immigration system.
CONCLUSION
The INA precludes administrative review by the Secretary of
State. Proceeding on the premise that the INA's legislative history
does not expressly preclude judicial review of consular visa denials,
what functional objections exist to such review? Does the consul's
role in foreign affairs insulate him from judicial review? The Su-
preme Court has held that it is a mistake "to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.""1 2 The INA describes the classes of aliens who may be
lawfully barred from entry, and the propriety of that policy determi-
nation by Congress is beyond judicial scrutiny. But judicial review of
the application of that law to the facts of the case does not involve
foreign policy determinations any more than does the consul's initial
decision. Moreover, litigation over the propriety of a consular of-
ficer's decision will not encumber the operation of the visa applica-
tion process except to ensure that future decisions are in accord with
the law. Administrative or judicial review would promote uniformity
in an area where uneven ad hoc decisionmaking goes unchecked. Al-
though courts realize there are limits to their ability to effect coordi-
nation in administrative agencies, review is particularly important
here, precisely because the consular visa process provides no other
remedy to guarantee uniformity.
Consular visa decisions rarely present complex questions of inter-
national or domestic importance. They normally comprise no more
tlian the application of a detailed statutory standard to a set of facts.
Visa denials must be based on one or more of the grounds of exclu-
sion provided in the INA, and the reasons are to be explained to the
unsuccessful visa applicant. Ample legislative guidance and the con-
siderable body of case law developed in the deportation and exclu-
sion contexts exist to enable members of a review board to perform
their traditional function when reviewing consular decisions. The leg-
islative policy behind the various grounds for exclusion would be bet-
ter effectuated by the unifying results of administrative or judicial
review rather than the absolute autonomy of each consular visa of-
ficer. If review is not available on a constitutional basis, the APA
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Note, Judicial Review of
Visa Denials: Reexamining Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
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offers a strong statutory basis for obtaining judicial review.
As Professor Louis Jaffe told the President's Commission on Im-
migration and Naturalization in 1952:
If there is such a thing as an axiom of law, it is that where there is power
there must be safeguards against the abuse of power .... [I]t is indefen-
sible to give to any man, acting in secret in a remote land, autocratic power
to grant or withhold a privilege of such enormous value as that of entrance
to this country.1
113. Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, House Comm. on Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575, 1578 (1952) (statement
of Louis Jaffe & Henry Hoa).

